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Abstract: Education has long been used as a tool for national identity formation and
social cohesion. However, in diverse communities across the globe, the question must be
asked: are educational institutions creating citizens with a narrow view of “us vs. them”
or an identity built on multiculturalism and acceptance? Through past research, it is
obvious that education has either acted as an instigator or mitigator of civil conflict,
though to what extent is still largely unknown. In this thesis, I argue that both the extent
and quality of education in a country can instigate or, at least, exacerbate the outbreak of
civil conflict. To prove this hypothesis, I will highlight two educational factors as
causally connected to civil conflict: educational access and educational content. First,
educational access can affect civil conflict since a lack of educational and, in effect,
economic opportunities may lead to rebel recruitment of a country’s youth. Second,
educational content can affect civil conflict, as the language, images, and facts utilized in
schools’ curricula may stir up ethnic and religious divides and hatred. In conclusion,
though educational access is certainly connected to civil conflict, the results are varied,
thus necessitating the need to dig deeper into the curricula of countries affected by civil
conflict. These factors will help to pinpoint problem areas in the educational systems of
countries dangerously close to civil conflict, as well as how to reshape educational
policies for the future.
Chapter One: Introduction
For my thesis, I will focus on the role of education as either an instigator or
mitigator of civil conflict. On the one hand, education has been used to assuage civil
conflict by fostering a citizenship that values tolerance for other religions and ethnicities,
as well as non-violent political participation. On the other hand, education has been
equally used to indoctrinate its citizens with ethnic hatred, fear, and a militant nationalism
that breeds civil conflict. This topic is personally intriguing to me because for the past
seven years, I have been involved in international education in a variety of roles — both
as a teacher and as an administrator. Although I have never taught in a country
undergoing civil conflict, I have personally seen how a closed-minded, intolerant
educational system can affect students’ outlook towards their country and “the other.” I
taught business English in the international business department at a Chinese university
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for three years, and I was shocked to see an educational system that lacked critical
thinking, heralded an unquestioning acceptance of what was being taught, dissuaded
classroom participation or differing opinions, and promoted a nationalism that demonized
other Asian cultures and minorities within China. In my role as a teacher there and in my
current role as a program manager at an international school, I have seen how education
is one of the most influential factors in a person’s life, identity, and worldview, and it
absolutely affects how that person views and treats “the other.” In this regard, I believe
that education should play a key role in international development, especially in countries
ravaged by civil conflict. It is important to note that for my thesis, education will be
defined as the vehicle by which systematic instruction is given to mass populations via
the state or religious institutions. An educational system must first and foremost prepare
trained citizens, who can enter the workforce as contributors to society; however, what is
often lost within that description is the key role education plays in fostering a stable
society based on peace, tolerance, non-violent political participation, civic values, and an
acceptance of a variety of viewpoints. Too often, educational systems fail in this regard
by breeding ethnic dissension through biased curricular content or unequal access; by
dissuading critical thinking, so that citizens will not question government decisions; or by
simply not providing sufficient educational and, therefore, economic opportunities.
Furthermore, civil conflict will be defined as a war or internal struggle between two or
more organized groups within the state.
From the research that I have done on this topic, it appears that the majority of
past articles have been highly policy-oriented, focusing largely on the task of post!2

conflict educational reconstruction. In The Hidden Crisis, UNESCO’s Education For All
(EFA) Director Kevin Watkins states, “The role of education in contributing to the
conditions for armed conflict has received little systematic attention on the part of
governments and aid donors.”1 Therefore, more research needs to be done from a
theoretical standpoint of why education might instigate or mitigate civil conflict. In
addition, though there have been several studies done on the “quantity” of education
(enrollment statistics), there have been relatively few studies done on the “quality” of
education (curricular content), which is where I intend to focus my research.2 Thus, a few
unanswered questions emerge in this field: (1) what are the effects of curricular content
on civil conflict instigation or resumption? (2) Are there commonalities that can be traced
cross-regionally or internationally in terms of a biased curricula? (3) When examining
curricular content, what are the most important factors as they relate to ethnic or religious
divisions? (4) Do educational factors play a primary role in instigating civil conflict, or
are they merely used by the state to exacerbate already-present divisions and tensions?
For my thesis, I argue that both the extent and quality of education in a country
can instigate or exacerbate the outbreak of civil conflict. To prove this hypothesis, I will
highlight two causal factors as instigators of civil conflict: educational access and
educational content. First, educational access highlights what effects poor enrollment

Kevin Watkins, Director of the EFA Global Monitoring Report, 2011, The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and
Education (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2011), 160.
2 See Gudrun Ostby and Henrik Urdal, “Education and Civil Conflict: A Review of the Quantitative,
Empirical Literature,” UNESCO Education for All Global Monitoring Report (2010): 24; Cf. Mohammad Zulfan
Tadjoeddin and Syed Mansoob Murshed, “Socio-Economic Determinants of Everyday Violence in Indonesia: An
Empirical Investigation of Javanese Districts, 1994-2003,” Journal of Peace Research vol. 44, no. 6 (November 2007):
705; Cf. Bilal Barakat and Henrik Urdal, “Breaking the Waves? Does Education Mediate the Relationship Between
Youth Bulges and Political Violence?” The World Bank Africa Region: Post Conflict and Social Development Unit
(November 2009): 24; Cf. John Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, “Educational Access and Peace Duration in PostConflict Countries,” International Interactions vol. 38, no. 1 (2012): 74.
1
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rates and unequal access to education based on ethnicity or gender have on civil conflict.
Second, educational content analyzes the language and images utilized in schools’
curricula in order to pinpoint where ethnic and religious divides are promoted. For
example, the way a state teaches its history frequently manipulates ethnicity and plays on
an “us vs. them” mentality. The effects of these factors will help to pinpoint problem
areas in the educational systems of countries dangerously close to civil conflict, as well
as how to reshape educational policies and infrastructure for the future.
This study will utilize both quantitative and qualitative analyses to focus
specifically on the civil conflict case studies of Sudan, Kosovo, and Pakistan, as well as
the contrasting case of Canada. The reasons for choosing case studies in Sudan, Kosovo,
and Pakistan are because of prior field work done there, the fact that I was able to gain
access to portions of their curricula, the large-scale nature of their civil conflict atrocities,
and for their regional diversity. Canada was chosen as the contrasting case study because
of its low-level of conflict, coupled with its high-level of diversity. In terms of
quantitative analysis, my study will utilize the PRIO/Uppsala conflict dataset and the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (ILASA) educational dataset, as
applied in the seminal studies performed by Bilal Barakat and Henrik Urdal in “Breaking
the Waves?” and Clayton Thyne in “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule.”3 The first part
of my research will attempt to discover a causal connection between a country’s level and
access to education in relation to civil conflict probability. However, in order to dig

See Barakat and Urdal, “Breaking the Waves?”; Cf. Clayton Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s and the Golden Rule: The
Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999,” International Studies Quarterly vol. 50, no. 4 (December
2006).
3
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deeper into the correlation between educational factors and civil conflict onset, the
majority of my research will focus on a qualitative analyses of curricular content, as well
as data from prior fieldwork and interview transcripts. From this past research and a fresh
look at various curricula, I hope to glean information on the quality of the education
systems in Sudan, Kosovo, Pakistan, and Canada. When analyzing these curricula, this
study seeks to identify what biases a country might instill in its students regarding its
history, any language patterns or images that might be used to further divide ethnic and
religious groups, and whether or not civic values and behavior are stressed through
participation and discussion of a variety of viewpoints in the classroom setting.
I hope this research will help to convince governments to incorporate these
findings into their educational systems. If ethnically-biased education has played a vital
role in the onset of civil conflict in the past, then an understanding of this topic will be
crucial to identifying early warning signs of civil conflict and human rights abuses that
may not have been utilized. Therefore, educational factors ought to be a larger focus of
the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review and NGO human rights and
development reports. In addition, a better understanding of this topic and the root causes
of conflict can equally help shape educational policy in countries either already affected
by civil conflict or teetering on the brink of civil conflict. Education should play a vital
role in the development of poor countries, not only in the present, but for shaping future
generations of tolerant, informed citizens for a more peaceful and economically-thriving,
global society.
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Chapter Two: A Review of the Literature
The majority of past research on the connection between education and civil
conflict either dealt with a lack of educational access as a motivator of grievance leading
up to civil conflict4 or policy-oriented strategies related to post-conflict educational
reconstruction. 5 Beyond these articles, there are several resources that are helpful in
either offering a broad perspective of educational factors that lead to civil conflict or
specific qualitative case studies that have been performed in certain countries.
Nonetheless, there exists little research on the effects of the quality of educational
curricular content as a primary cause of civil conflict, which is where my thesis will
hopefully be able to contribute to the existing literature.
In UNICEF’s original study, The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict,
Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli examine both the positive and negative aspects of
education’s effect on past ethnic conflicts. Bush and Saltarelli’s work recognizes the
importance of ethnicity for a child’s socialization and identity formation, as well as how
ethnicity has been manipulated through education. Thus, an uneven distribution of
education for purposes of cultural repression and segregation, as well as a rewriting of
textbooks are cited as negative aspects of education’s effect on ethnic conflict. On the
other hand, linguistic and ethnic tolerance, citizenship values, and equal educational
opportunities are listed as positive aspects in terms of avenues by which education can be

See Barakat and Urdal, “Breaking the Waves?”; Cf. Marie Besancon, “Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars,
Revolutions, and Genocides,” Journal of Peace Research vol. 42, no. 4 (July 2005); Cf. Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers vol. 56, no. 4 (October 2004); Cf. Nicholas
Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War,” Perspectives on Politics vol. 2, no. 2 (June
2004); Cf. Tadjoeddin and Murshed, “Socio-Economic Determinants of Everyday Violence in Indonesia.”
5 See Ishiyama and Breuning, “Educational Access and Peace Duration in Post-Conflict Countries.”
4
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used to mitigate ethnic conflict. The purpose of Bush and Saltarelli’s work is not to focus
solely on the causes of ethnic conflict, per se, but to propose a peacebuilding education
for the future in developing countries.6
Since Bush and Saltarelli’s work, the research on education and civil conflict has
proliferated, eventually leading to UNESCO’s annual EFA Global Monitoring Report, as
well as the book, The Hidden Crisis. Within this report, UNESCO identified the
educational needs and pitfalls of countless countries affected by civil conflict. The
majority of the book is focused on how armed conflict can act as a barrier to EFA, with a
purpose towards laying out a plan for financing peacebuilding and educational
reconstruction globally. Nonetheless, one chapter does highlight various educational
failures that may “fan the flames” of armed conflict, such as ethnic segregation,
reinforcing a culture of violence, and linguistic repression. Again, the purpose of The
Hidden Crisis is to lay out the goals of attaining EFA, while highlighting the failures of
the international community in response to global educational needs and financing.7 In
sum, UNICEF’s Two Faces and UNESCO’s Hidden Crisis represent the overview of a
much bigger problem as it relates to education’s effect on civil conflict and vice versa.
In response to The Hidden Crisis and EFA’s failures, Patrick Montjourides
pinpoints an additional “failure” as a lack of education data in general. Montjourides
concludes that robust data can help inform and design good policy choices, predict future
trends, and monitor educational policy impact. 8 Unfortunately, countries in conflict do
See Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli, editors, The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a
Peacebuilding Education for Children (Florence: United Nations Children’s Fund Innocenti Research Centre, 2000).
7 See Watkins, The Hidden Crisis.
8 See Patrick Montjourides, “Education Data in Conflict-Affected Countries: The Fifth Failure,”
Prospects: Quarterly Review of Comparative Education vol. 43, no. 1 (2013).
6
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not make gathering this type of data a high priority for obvious reasons. Nonetheless,
Montjourides states that “poor-quality, or completely absent, data deny millions of
children the right to education,” since such data could certainly help international
organizations, such as UNICEF, to lead educational reform in countries ravaged by civil
conflict.9 Thus, a key deterrent of research in this field and this present thesis stems from
a lack of data, enrollment records, and textbooks to be examined.
Beyond these chief overviews and their varied responses, several articles have
been written from a much more focused perspective. For example, in “Education in Peace
Agreements,” Kendra Dupuy notes the varying degrees to which education is addressed
in over 100 peace agreements in the post-Cold War era. Perhaps more importantly, Dupuy
examines how education is viewed as a long-term, key element to achieving sustainable
peace in countries affected by civil conflict and how education has played a contributory
role in the outbreak of civil conflict in countries such as Sudan and Sierra Leone through
its exclusionary curriculum or segregated classroom settings.10
Additionally, Lynn Davies, in her article “Schools and War,” addresses the
growing concerns raised in terms of education creating situations ripe for conflict through
inequality and exclusion, a perpetuation of ethnic or religious divisions, and a curriculum
that emphasizes a narrow worldview. In this regard, Davies presents various remedies
that include civic education and comparative educational studies that pinpoint educational
contributions to either peace or conflict. In general, Davies lobbies for greater research

Ibid, 85.
See Kendra Dupuy, “Education in Peace Agreements, 1989-2005,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly vol. 26, no. 2
(December 2008).
9
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into the effects of peace versus war-time education, as well as why young people join
fundamentalist or extremist religious movements.11
Clayton Thyne in, “ABC’s, 123’s and the Golden Rule,” proposes two arguments:
1) that educational investment provides a sign to the people that the government is
interested in improving their lives and welfare and 2) that education can generate stability
by giving people the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully, which makes them less likely
to violently rebel. Thyne’s findings show that educational investment lowers the
probability of civil war, especially when it is distributed equitably across the country to
all classes and people groups. Furthermore, enrollment rates and literacy rates were
shown to increase low-level political protests, but decrease violent forms of rebellion,
which shows that educated citizens are more stable in that they use the political processes
in their possession to seek peaceful solutions to various problems, rather than war. 12
Gudrun Ostby and Henrik Urdal in their work, “Education and Civil Conflict: A
Review of the Quantitative, Empirical Literature,” overview the research that has been
done in the field of education and civil conflict, highlighting the strengths of the literature
and the areas for further research. Ostby and Urdal readily admit that the majority of past
research in this area has been qualitative, with scant international quantitative data
available. In general, Ostby and Urdal recognize education’s role in either promoting
peace or conflict; and with the quantitative data that is available, they argue that
secondary enrollment statistics remain the major discriminators in terms of understanding

See Lynn Davies, “Schools and War: Urgent Agendas for Comparative and International Education,” Compare: A
Journal of Comparative Education vol. 35, no. 4 (December 2005).
12 See Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule.”
11
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education’s connection to civil conflict onset, since it is young males who primarily make
up militant and rebel groups.13 However, Ostby and Urdal further note a serious lack of
quantitative analyses on the effects of “educational quality or content.”14
In this regard, terrorist and extremist activity is a prime example of why it is not
just about educational access, but content and quality as well. It is widely assumed that
terrorists are ignorant or act out of desperation in their poverty, which would lead one to
assume a lack of education as the only causal factor for their joining extremist
movements, but such is not the case. As Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova prove in
“Education, Poverty, and Terrorism,” terrorists tend to be highly-educated and from more
privileged backgrounds than was previously assumed, since such recruits are more likely
to possess an understanding of political participation and have the luxury to strongly
commit to an ideological cause.15 Furthermore, an examination by Claude Berrebi
entitled, “Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty, and Terrorism Among
Palestinians,” examines Palestinian curricula to show why educational content matters
when thinking through the ramifications of highly-educated Hamas militants:
Palestine is your country… that its pure soil is drenched with the blood of
Martyrs… Answer this: Why must we fight the Jews and drive them out of
our land? Without blood not even one centimeter will be liberated… The
oppressors [Israel] have overstepped the boundary. Therefore Jihad and
sacrifice are a duty.16

See Ostby and Urdal, “Education and Civil Conflict.”
Ibid, 24.
15 See Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal
Connection?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives vol. 17, no. 4 (Autumn 2003).
16 Claude Berrebi, “Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty, and Terrorism among
Palestinians,” Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy vol. 13, no. 1 (2007), 29.
13
14
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Thus, as Berrebi concludes, “These are sufficient to suggest that policy makers, when
trying to reduce terrorism via education, should focus not solely on the amount of
education but also on its content.”17
Several other works have focused on specific case studies in a qualitative,
interview format, especially in Rwanda. In “The Role of Education in Driving Conflict
and Building Peace: The Case of Rwanda,” Lyndsay McLean Hilker studies the
relationship between education, conflict, and peacebuilding in the Rwandan genocide and
aftermath. Her research was based primarily on interviews commissioned by the EFA
Global Monitoring Report put out by UNESCO in 2011. Hilker’s research proves that a
major cause of the Rwandan genocide can be linked to educational content and access.
Prior to the genocide, there were significant inequalities of access to education based on
class, ethnicity, and region. Similarly, state curricula emphasized a history of ethnic
differences and past conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi, which can be traced to the
influence of Belgian colonial powers. This inequality of educational access, coupled with
the intolerant curriculum, led to a number of young children taking part in the Rwandan
genocide.18 Similarly, Anna Obura’s book, Never Again and Elisabeth King’s work, From
Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda, closely mirror Hilker’s assessment of the role that
Rwanda’s educational system played in exacerbating its civil conflict and genocide,
though both of their works have the added focus of creating an educational reconstruction

Ibid, 29.
See Lyndsay McLean Hilker, “The Role of Education in Driving Conflict and Building Peace: The
Case of Rwanda,” Prospects: Quarterly Review of Comparative Education vol. 41, no. 2 (2011).
17
18
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policy that builds on civic values, a shared Rwandan identity outside of tribalism, and an
honest retelling of its history from both a Hutu and Tutsi perspective.19
In sum, through a review of the literature, it is evident that there are two major
avenues by which countries have failed their citizens from an educational standpoint: a
lack of access to education and an ethnically-charged curricula that promotes intolerance
and fosters fear and hatred. Despite the influence of these works, it must be noted that the
majority of past research on education and civil conflict has not focused on educational
systems prior to the civil conflict. Thus, more research needs to be done from a
theoretical standpoint as to why education might instigate or mitigate civil conflict, rather
than focusing completely on educational reconstruction. It is my hope that my thesis will
contribute to this literature by further answering the question of how the quality and
content of education contributes to civil conflict onset, as well as comparing the available
data across several cases to better understand the commonalities and patterns of how
curricular content causes civil conflict and how it might be used to mitigate civil conflict
in the future.

See Anna Obura, Never Again: Educational Reconstruction in Rwanda (Paris: International Institute for Educational
Planning, 2003). Cf. Elisabeth King, From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2014).
19
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Chapter Three: Quantitative Analyses of the Connection Between Levels of
Educational Attainment and Civil Conflict
There have been multiple studies that have focused on the connection between
educational statistics and civil conflict onset through quantitative analyses. In the
majority of cases, educational variables are deemed statistically significant when it comes
to examining their causal connections to civil conflict onset or resumption; however,
there also exists wide differences of opinion as to questions of endogeneity. Where all
research can agree is the importance of secondary enrollment variables as “the most
suitable discriminator in assessing the role of education in conflict.” 20 Nonetheless,
several authors question whether education is any discriminator at all, or whether their
findings are simply conflating education with levels of poverty or development, ethnic
tensions in general, or regime type. Similarly, research is varied on the role of higher
education, the effects of religious schooling, and even the core question of why education
affects conflict onset in general: whether as a grievance of lost economic opportunity or
as a tool of political manipulation. 21 In order to address these questions, my research will
highlight former studies performed by Clayton Thyne and Bilal Barakat and Henrik Urdal
in order to show that there is indeed a causal connection between education and civil
conflict that can be proven quantitatively, but also to point out that mere statistics cannot
answer this question in full.
In his seminal study, Thyne combines education variables to a previous study
performed by James Fearon and D. David Laitin in 2003 entitled, “Ethnicity, Insurgency,
20
21

Ostby and Urdal, “Education and Civil Conflict,” 12-13.
Ibid, 21.
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and Civil War,” which tested various hypotheses on civil conflict onset. Thyne’s dataset
includes 160 countries from 1980 to 1999 and utilizes various control variables from
Fearon and Laitin, such as prior war, population measurements, mountainous terrain or
contiguous territory, and regime type, among others.22 The dependent variable is civil
conflict onset, and the independent variables are educational in nature: investment in
education, primary enrollment rates, secondary enrollment rates, postsecondary
enrollment rates, and adult literacy. By performing various quantitative analyses on this
dataset, Thyne finds that an increase in the following variables from one standard
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean results in the
following respective decreases in the probability of civil conflict onset: 73% decrease for
an increase in primary enrollment rates, 54% decrease for an increase in educational
22

Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule,” 739.
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expenditures, 43% decrease for and increase in adult literacy, and 63% decrease for an
increase in secondary enrollment rates.23 Thyne readily admits that his study could suffer
from endogeneity, though he is adamant in stating that educational variables are not
merely conflating questions of poverty, as some claim. He proves this by performing a
further test separated by wealth and resource type to show that educational statistics are
still a strong indicator of civil conflict onset probability.24 Thyne produces the graph
shown in figure 1 above to highlight the connection between levels of enrollment and
civil conflict probability, which is most drastic and progressive among male youths. In
general, an increase in educational opportunities for young children and youth and further
investment in education from the government will drastically reduce probabilities of civil
conflict, regardless of regime type or levels of poverty.
While Thyne focuses on probabilities of civil conflict onset based on general
enrollment statistics, Barakat and Urdal focus on countries with large young male
populations in low-income countries (youth bulges) and a more nuanced set of
educational attainment statistics as causal factors for civil conflict onset. Barakat and
Urdal utilized a dataset created by the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA) that measures a variety of educational attainment statistics for 120
countries from 1970 to 2000, which is considered by many to be the most complete
educational dataset available.25 IIASA’s educational data is the independent variable, and
domestic armed conflict onset as covered by the Uppsala/PRIO internal conflict study is

Ibid, 743.
Ibid, 746-749.
25 Barakat and Urdal, “Breaking the Waves?” 3.
23
24
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the dependent variable. 26 It must be noted that the IIASA dataset attempts to overcome
past deficiencies of UNESCO’s limited educational enrollment statistics by focusing on
demographic analyses through educational attainment statistics gained through past
censuses. In so doing, IIASA has succeeded in discovering the highest educational
attainment of each age group in a population from either (1) no schooling, (2) some
primary, (3) completed lower secondary, or (4) completed tertiary.27 In this way, a better
educational profile of a population can be built from simple demographic methods, which
can overcome past
data deficiencies of
entire years or
periods of enrollment
numbers lost due to
civil conflict or poor
record-keeping in
failed states.
Similarly, IIASA’s
data can track
enrollment progression of individuals and groups.28
Through their research, Barakat and Urdal prove that secondary enrollment
attainment has a statistically significant effect on civil conflict, especially in low and

Ibid, 3, 7.
Ibid, 8.
28 Ibid, 7-8.
26
27
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middle income countries with youth bulges. In table 1 shown above, Model 1 captures
15-24 year old males in general; Model 2 represents the Relative Youth Cohort Size,
which measures the dynamics of a working class by using a ratio of 15-29 year old
workers vs. 30-44 year old workers; Model 3 adds education variables; Model 4 adds
GDP, rather than mere development variables; and Model 5 constitutes secondary
attainment statistics for both male and female. As can be seen particularly from Models 4
and 5, secondary attainment statistics have a strong correlation to internal armed conflict.
In conclusion, Barakat and Urdal conclude that educational variables have a strong
pacifying effect.29 In addition, a stratification model is run to answer the question of
whether education serves merely as a proxy for general development, which they are able
to answer in the negative; thus, education does serve as a statistically significant
discriminator on its own.30
In sum, it can be seen from these studies that there exists a causal connection
between education and civil conflict from a quantitative perspective. In fact, past research
has also been able to tentatively prove that educational variables are not merely proxies
for core issues of general development. Indeed, secondary enrollment attainment in
particular serves as an important discriminator of civil conflict regardless of regime type,
resource type, or GDP. Nonetheless, statistics cannot tell the whole story; therefore,
educational attainment, though causally connected to civil conflict, must be
complemented by deeper research into the actual curricular content of schools.

29
30

Ibid, 14-15.
Ibid, 18.
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Chapter Four: Curricular Content Analyses in Countries Affected by Civil Conflict
— Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sudan
The Constitution of UNESCO states, “Since wars begin in the minds of men [and
women], it is in the minds of men [and women] that the defenses of peace must be
constructed.” 31 It is no secret that education plays an integral role in forming the
understandings, attitudes, and even behaviors of individuals, and it has long been seen as
an important tool for fostering civic values and peace. However, what has been less
understood is how education can equally foster “ethnic exclusivity,” a disdain for “the
other,” and violent ambitions for the “homeland.”32 In this regard, nationalism is a way
by which a people can define themselves and segregate themselves from others, and it
has been used by various states to create a sense of allegiance, as well as fuel for conflict
when an enemy threatens that allegiance. Within a nationalistic identity, there is a sense
of preserving the uniqueness of the nation through labels, stereotypes, and categorization
of those within the in-group and those without — “the enemy” — which is achieved
through a standardization of culture and “nation-formation.” 33 Nationalism unites people
around common attributes and culture and a shared history that differentiates them from
other peoples; but therein lies the problem, as nationalism throughout history has
exacerbated differences to the extreme — many times along ethnic or religious lines.

Watkins, The Hidden Crisis, ii.
Bush and Saltarelli, The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict, 9. Cf. Elisabeth King, “Educating for Conflict or
Peace: Challenges and Dilemmas in Post-Conflict Rwanda, International Journal vol. 60, no. 4, 2005, p. 908.
33 Diana Oncioiu, “Ethnic Nationalism and Genocide: Constructing ‘the Other’ in Romania and Serbia,” in Ugur Umit
Ungor, ed., Genocide: New Perspectives on its Causes, Courses, and Consequences (Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 2016), 27-28.
31
32
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As a means of mass indoctrination, what is taught within the classroom plays a
vital role in formulating and cultivating this national identity. Therefore, though
understanding levels of educational attainment is important for a study of civil conflict,
actual curricular content and the quality of that content are of far greater importance. In
order to understand the effects of curricular content on civil conflict, this thesis will
examine the case studies of Kosovo, Sudan, and Pakistan in order to pinpoint where
ethnic or religious tensions are exacerbated through ideological images and language
inserted in textbooks. In these countries, it becomes obvious that interest groups on both
sides of each conflict utilized education as a means to instill a narrow national identity in
the minds of future generations. Effective strategies include a rewriting or editing of
history, a visual distortion of geography, extremist language and values, and a wide-scale
homogenization of a heterogenous culture or religion through standardized syllabi.
Kosovo
The conflict over Kosovo revolved around a simple question: to whom did
Kosovo belong?34 As Noel Malcom states, “All parties can agree that the issue of Kosovo
is, quite simply, the most intractable of all the political conflicts in the Balkans.”35 Within
this conflict, education became a unique spark point of Kosovo’s sovereignty and
nationhood for both parties since Serbs and Albanians alike understood that “the control
of Kosovo’s education system emerged as tantamount to control of Kosovo’s territory.”36
In fact, as Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland note, education lies at the very center of

Denisa Kostovicova, Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1.
Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998), xxvii.
36 Kostovicova, Kosovo, 74.
34
35

!19

the Kosovo conflict.37 Under Serb control in the 1970s and 1980s, Kosovo’s schools were
primarily attended by Serbs and Montenegrins even with Albanians constituting around
90% of the population.38 Thus, from the beginning, ethnically-segregated classrooms
became a focal point of the Kosovo conflict. Eventually, Albanians responded to Serbian
control of Kosovo’s classrooms and textbooks by opening an underground parallel
education network within homes throughout the country as a means of secret resistance in
the early 1990s. It is important to note the importance of this parallel education system
because it was considered the only fully-functioning arm of the Kosovo “shadow state”
under Albanian rule; because of this, it had a huge role politically and symbolically for
Albanians seeking independence.39 According to Denisa Kostovicova, the parallel
education system allowed an unprecedented level of conflicting nationalisms to develop
in the classrooms and curricula on both sides. In effect, Serbs and Albanians alike were
free from the influence of the other to edit and rewrite vast portions of their history and
geography textbooks, leading to mutually exclusive understandings of Kosovo with little
room for agreement. This, coupled with total ethnic segregation within the classrooms,
severely exacerbated the Kosovo conflict.40 In time, though the parallel education system
began as a non-violent protest, it eventually devolved into violent rebellion and armed
conflict.41 This section will examine Serb control of the education system and the
response of the Albanian parallel education system as separate attempts to homogenize
Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland, Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the Education System in Kosovo (Paris:
International Institute for Educational Planning, 2004), 34.
38 Kostovicova, Kosovo, 1.
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heterogeneous cultures, as well as the use of history, geography, and language within the
textbooks of Kosovo’s competing curricula.
Even though most societies are ethnically heterogeneous, education systems often
maintain a fiction of cultural homogeneity through a common language and history, as
well as a national literature. Such was certainly the case in Kosovo, where the Serbian
government adopted an education policy of “assimilation,” whereby the Albanian
language was eliminated in schools and Serbian standardized textbooks that minimized
the Albanian “minority national identity” were introduced — “measures that many blame
for the ensuing strife.”42 Loss of language was equated to Albanians since the time of the
Ottomans as a loss of nation itself; thus, rather than ensuring unity, such a policy by the
Serbs incited a violent response from the Albanians.43 Furthermore, in the 1980s, the
communist leadership saw Albanian textbooks as a hotbed of Albanian nationalism and,
therefore, an “enemy ideology.” Thus, an “Action Programme” was put into effect that
would analyze all curricula according to Marxist values in order to weed out any
“nationalist consciousness.” 44 Albanian folk dances were removed from music curriculum
because they were “reminiscent of national consciousness,” as was all Albanian songs in
general.45 In the end, the Programme found the Albanian textbooks to be detrimental to
Kosovar peace because of their promotion of Albanian “self-management” at the expense
of Yugoslav centrality and unity.46 With control over the textbooks, Serbia wanted to
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foster a sense of belonging to the Yugoslav shared identity by essentially removing any
ethnic and cultural differences within Kosovo.47 In sum, the educational leadership were
attempting to promote a “political socialization” of unity that transcended ethnicity
through a unified educational system and a curricular common core. However, this only
reinforced Albanian feelings of repression, thus resulting in the parallel education
system.48 At the beginning of the 1991 school year, Albanians were completely excluded
from all schools in Kosovo and, in some cases, even barred from entrance by tanks.49
Homogenization was not just a goal of Serbs, but of Albanians as well when it
came to their parallel education network. Any Albanian teacher who sympathized with
Serbs or sought to include multiculturalism in the classroom were banished or even
physically persecuted. 50 Furthermore, any opposition to the independence movement of
Albanian Kosovo was all but removed from Albanian history textbooks. In the two
paragraphs that do describe any opposition, it is not clear that the opposition came from
within Kosovo, but instead attributes it to Turkish and Bosnian Muslim troublemakers.
Therefore, Albanians attempted to maintain the illusion of national unity in their struggle
for Kosovar autonomy. Kostovicova calls this an “ironing” of factual history by
smoothing out conflicts in favor of a vision of national unity and uniformity.51
Interestingly enough, with the onset of the parallel education system, Kosovo Albanians
attempted to create a unification of curricula across state lines with their Albanian
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neighbors. However, similar hardships ensued as Kosovo Albanians had to fight for
Kosovo-specific content in the newly-establish Albanian common core.52 Thus, Serbian
communist leadership asserted an ideology of shared Yugoslav “brotherhood” in its
curriculum, while Albanians promoted only its national identity, exclusive of all other
interpretations and other minority people groups in the area. Both were insensitive to
national diversity, though in different ways, which hindered multiculturalism.53 In the
end, everything collapsed in late 1997, when passive student resistance gave way to
armed struggle and support of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In a survey
conducted by a student newspaper on students’ opinions towards solving the Kosovo
problem, 8 percent favored passive pacifism, 64.5 percent argued for active pacifism, and
27.5 percent called for armed struggle. 54 These KLA soldiers were subsequently
described as “martyrs” for the freedom of Kosovo. And in conclusion, one Albanian
textbook states, “The freedom was won with blood, that is why it is sacred.”55
Textbooks in the Albanian parallel education system were based on the pre-1989
Albanian-language curriculum. However, an underground textbook producer began
smuggling in revisions and modifications in specific subjects, such as history, geography,
music, and other cultural subjects, in order to include a “stronger focus on Kosovo
Albanian interpretations.” 56 When certain subjects had little bearing on aspects of
nationhood, such as science or math, Albanians used the common core curriculum that
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was developed in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade.57 In light of this double standard, it becomes
obvious that nation formation was at the center of the Albanian parallel education system,
which was most effectively implemented through history.
Albanians and Serbs each possessed a distinct understanding of the history of
Kosovo, which can be seen from the multitude of differences in their respective
textbooks. Indeed, Buckland and Sommers note that the majority of their interviews
highlighted primarily differences in history.58 For example, Albanians in Kosovo claimed
their descent to Illyrian ancestry, thus reinforcing the right to Kosovo land by way of
“first occupation.” In effect, by linking their origins to a predecessor established in the
land well before the arrival of the Slavs in the sixth century, Albanians could invoke prior
claim over the Serbs.59 In addition to espousing Illyrian origins, Albanian textbooks
depict Serbs as “colonists” or “occupiers,” as a means to represent Serbs as an external
oppressor, rather than a settler in the territory alongside Albanians from early history. 60
On the other hand, in a Serb eighth grade textbook, Albanian presence in Kosovo is
downplayed and explained as such:
Even though Kosovo, Metohija, and Rajka were inhabited by a Serbian
population back to the Middle Ages and were indisputable centres of Serbian
statehood and spirituality, great demographic changes, to the detriment of the
Serbs, occurred there during Turkish rule, and especially in the eighteenth
century and the first half of the nineteenth. As cattle-breeders, Islamicized
Albanians gradually occupied the mountain pastures in Kosovo and Metohija and
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in Rajka and then descended into the fertile Kosovo valleys and lowlands,
forcing out the native Serbian population.61
Thus, neither side recognized the other as rightful claimants to Kosovo, and both utilized
harsh language within their textbooks to not only make their own claims unquestionable,
but to downplay the presence of the other and even to demean the other as either a
colonist, an immigrant, or a backward nomad with no claim to the civilized centers of
Kosovo. In fact, both accounts of history in the competing textbooks fail to account for
the fact that Serbs and Albanians coexisted for over a millennium, thus deemphasizing
their “shared experience” of centuries-long domination by outside forces.62
For both Serbs and Albanians, the Battle of Kosovo of 1389 remains integral to
their competing national identities, but for different reasons and with different emphases.
In this battle, a Balkan, multiethnic alliance fought against the Ottoman Muslims outside
of Pristina. While the Balkan alliance lost this battle, it has been mythologized as a
“spiritual victory” for both Serbs and Albanians, as it was thought to have played a key
role in slowing the Ottoman advance throughout the rest of the Balkan peninsula and
even Europe.63 While such a momentous event could have acted as a connection point for
both people groups, it instead incited feelings of separate national identities through
differing interpretations of the circumstances. Because of the central importance of Serb
King Lazar in the battle, Serbs recognize the Battle of Kosovo as their defining moment
and see Kosovo as “Heavenly Serbia.”64 The Serbian heroism of this battle is
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remembered through a particular flower native to the area. According to a Serbian
teacher, “The flower that grows on Kosovo Polje lives on human blood [of the slain
Serbian martyrs], so it can’t grow anywhere else.”65 Within this Kosovo myth, there
exists a call, even an obligation, to return to reclaim what was lost.66 And on the
memorial at the site, there also exists a curse: “Those who are Serbian and have a Serbian
heart and do not come to battle for Kosovo will not have children, either male or female,
crops or wine. They will be damned until they die.”67
However, in Albanian schools, the Serb King Lazar was present, but not
ultimately the hero. The hero, according to an Albanian history textbook, was “one
Albanian from Kosovo called Millosh, hidden among the dead, [who] attacked the Sultan
and killed him with a knife,” thus glossing over the Serb centrality in the standard myth. 68
On the other hand, Serbian textbooks do not even mention Albanian participation.69
Regardless of which case is true, neither text recognizes the multiethnic nature of this
battle, nor the complementary roles of either people groups. Indeed, Kostovicova notes
that when it came to the Battle of Kosovo, curricular input gave way to political
maneuvering on both sides. Serb communist textbook writers were given free reign to
interpret it according to the political agenda at the time, while the Albanian parallel
education system followed suit.70
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Similarly, it must be noted the emphasis that Albanians placed on their national
hero, Skanderbeg, who epitomized the struggle against the Ottoman and “served as a
source of inspiration for unification of Albanians in the struggle to regain freedom.”71
Indeed, textbooks in many countries worship heroes of war and martyrs, rather than
heroes of peace. Thus, the advance of civilization through peacetime is diminished, while
war and struggle become a central focus as movers of history. Therefore, violence is
legitimized as an “expression of political power.”72 In this case, the defense of Kosovo
required the ultimate sacrifice, much like Skanderbeg. Therefore, it is no wonder that one
Albanian textbook extolls Albanians to “not to give a single inch of the homeland of
Albanians to a foreign state. [They] would fight to the last man.”73 However, the reality is
that Skanderbeg and the mythic heroes of the Battle of Kosovo were fighting against the
same Turkish occupiers, eliciting “shared victimization.” However, resistance against
outside forces is not the purpose of these mythologies in both sides’ curricula. Rather,
both sides compete with “myths of the recovery of the same lost land.”74
Historical claims through words must be backed by geography as a visual
depiction of nationhood.75 When writing geography textbooks, Kostovicova notes that
there are various strategies of “spatial seduction” that can be used, such as visual
distortion and misdirection.76 In general, Kosovo is portrayed in Albanian textbooks as an
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independent nation since the early 1990s. Albanian cartographers even resorted to using
bold lines to clearly delineate the borders of Kosovo as an independent state; whereas
with Serbian maps, Kosovo was oftentimes not represented at all or given a dotted-line
boundary in order to render the illusion that it had always been a part of the Serb
republic.77 Thus, the territorial grievance of Kosovo for Albanians was a main motif of
both history and geography textbooks as the “biggest historical injustice.” 78
Finally, Albanian’s textbooks use vivid language to describe their victimized
history in light of Serbian “brutality,” juxtaposed with Albanian “martyrdom.” For
example, one passage from an Albanian textbook states, “The conquering Serbian army
committed large massacres. Tens of Albanian villages and towns were turned into ashes.
Thousands of Albanian men, women, children, and the elderly were killed in a barbarian
manner.”79 By using terminology such as massacre and barbarian, the Albanians utilized
extremist language in order to incite fear and hatred. Similarly, Albanians describe the
conflict with religious undertones, saying that Serbs implemented “forced conversion
from Islam and Catholicism to Orthodoxy.”80 They also frequent such terms as
“genocide” to describe Serb oppression, while martyrdom is a key aspect to describe the
struggle in general. For example, in the struggle that created the Serbian state, the
Albanian textbooks state that “thirty martyrs fell for the freedom of Kosovo during the
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demonstrations.”81 In effect, through the textbooks, martyrdom was given more
legitimacy than other forms of resistance that did not cost lives.
Furthermore, by omitting any other casualty other than Albanians in the civil
conflict, the parallel education curriculum gave the sense of “exclusive victimhood.”
Oftentimes, high casualty numbers were used with no reference, and “a frequent use of
words like ‘massacre’ and ‘genocide’ precluded any questioning of Albanian victimhood
in Kosovo.”82 On the flip side, Serbian textbooks explain that “Separatist and nationalist
Albanian groups were active in Kosovo… They conducted terror against the Serbian
people, burnt the Serbian villages and forced the Serbian settlers to emigrate.”83 Thus,
through one-sided history, Albanians are portrayed as the sole instigators of violence in
Kosovo.84 Finally, the derogatory term, Siptar, is commonly used by the Serbs in their
textbooks at this time to refer to Albanians as less than human. 85
If we are to understand the effects of the Albanian curricula in practice, we need
look no further than the assignments that students turned in while studying in the parallel
education system. Kostovicova includes several poems written by Albanian children in
the latter half of the 1990s, which covered the period when fighting between Serbian
security forces and Albanian armed guerrillas broke out. This is the moment when
resistance was no longer passive in terms of the parallel educational system, but active in
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armed conflict, and these poems reflect that transition of resistance as well.86
Interestingly enough, poems without a nationalistic topic, such as family or activities, are
few. Instead, the themes most discussed are “homeland, emigration, freedom, schools,
resistance, and repression.”87 These poems closely mirror what has been discussed in the
previous sections. For example, on martyrdom, one student states, “Hundreds of
thousands of martyrs for you, freedom, gave a life.” Another says, “I am not little, I am
telling you the truth, if there’s a need for Kosovo, I’d sacrifice life.” 88 In terms of the
importance of knowledge and education connected to freedom and Kosovar
independence, another student advises, “Let’s learn, oh friends, because only with
knowledge will we crush the enemy, can we win freedom, liberate the fatherland.”89
Similarly, essays written by students are filled with hateful language, especially when the
fighting broke out: “Your heart fills with hatred towards the Serbs, because the Serbs are
brutal, blood-sucking, treacherous, merciless people who have no drop of mercy in their
unfortunate heart.” 90 From these examples, it is obvious that the Albanian nationalism
and demonization of “the other” present in the parallel education system incited feelings
of hatred, fear, and a longing for glory in martyrdom and violence.
In conclusion, the case of Kosovo shows that an attempt at homogenization of a
culturally-diverse territory through systematized education does not result in unity, but
resistance and even violence. At the same time, completely distinct curricula on both
sides of a conflict, especially in history and geography, that not only refuses to recognize
Ibid, 168.
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“the other,” but demeans and demonizes them as well, certainly incites an equal amount
of hatred. Interestingly enough, Sommers and Buckland recognized a common theme
from both Albanian and Serb interviewees alike: the desire for the researchers to tell an
“objective story” in their curricular analysis.91 In other words, both sides wanted their
sides to be represented and understood, which must be the starting point for building a
curricula in any conflict-torn country. Still, the question must be asked: did the
educational situation in Kosovo contribute to the violence? Bush and Sartarelli conclude:
“There can be no doubt that the schism in education in Kosovo was a major contributor to
the upsurge of violence that reached its horrifying zenith in 1999.”92 Similarly, when the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took control, their initial response was that
teachers should use the existing curriculum, but “should avoid content or teaching that
may inflame conflict.”93 Thus, it was understood from an outside perspective that
education had a very real effect on the civil conflict. In sum, the case study of Kosovo is
useful for this thesis as education was not only a primary focal point of the conflict, but
also a primary instigator of ethnic and nationalistic differences.
Pakistan
Unlike other countries oftentimes cited in the education-civil conflict literature,
Pakistan’s problem does not lie in enrollment statistics or access to education — areas
where it tends to do comparatively well. Rather, the Pakistan “educational anomaly”
stems from the extreme polarization between the madrasah system and the public
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system.94 Nonetheless, both systems overlap in their propensities for instilling a repulsion
towards Hindus, while simultaneously portraying Pakistan as completely and
unquestionably Sunni-Muslim with no room for differences. The Pakistani statesponsored curricula and textbooks further this policy through its depiction of history and
geography, as well as its use of extreme or one-sided language and images. Of particular
note within the Pakistani public school system, the infamous Gilgit “textbook
controversy” relates a conflict that emerged precisely over biased curricular content and a
lack of minority representation. In terms of Pakistani religious education, it is no secret
that the madrasahs, through their unobstructed extremist views, have supplied jihadists in
the fight against Hindus and Shia Muslims within Pakistan for years now.
Much has been made in recent years about the extremism originating from
Pakistan’s madrasahs; however, as A.H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim note, madrasahs are
not the only educational institution breeding hatred within Pakistan: “the educational
material in the government run schools do much more than madrasahs. The textbooks tell
lies, create hatred, inculcate militancy, and much more.”95 This is accomplished through
the creation of a narrow Islamic identity.96 Therefore, it can be said that the main problem
within the Pakistani public education system is its homogenization agenda along Sunni
Muslim lines, at the expense of Hindu and Shia minorities, who are oftentimes violently
discriminated against as a result.
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The genesis of this homogenization can be traced back to General Zia-ul-Haq’s
coup in 1977 and the military government that followed. Throughout the 1980s, Zia-ulHaq introduced a policy of “Islamization” in Pakistani culture and history, thus
portraying Pakistan as a “besieged state that is under threat from a Hindu India on the one
hand and an anti-Islamic West on the other.” Such a policy has given younger generations
“an inherently paranoid outlook” towards ethnic and sectarian differences, leading to
oftentimes extremist ideologies. 97 This period of Islamization particularly affected
Pakistani textbooks through “a distorted narration of history, factual inaccuracies,
inclusion of hate material, a disproportionate inclusion of Islamic studies in other
disciplines, glorification of war and the military.” To make matters worse, governments
since then and up until present day have “either failed to check these harmful deviations,
or willingly perpetuated them.” 98 National curricula and textbooks are designed by the
Curriculum Wing of the Federal Ministry of Education and the regional Text Book
Boards, and it is this centralized system of education formation that is “perfectly suitable
for ideological indoctrination.”99
In general, the public education system has been used to downplay religious
diversity in Pakistan. A common principle that appears in the Pakistani pedagogical
documents throughout every grade is the following: “In the teaching material, no concept
of separation between the worldly and the religious be given; rather all the material be
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presented from the Islamic point of view.”100 Not only does this learning outcome leave
little room for civic engagement outside the religious realm, but it also discriminates
against non-Muslim minorities, who undoubtedly feel excluded from the classroom and
society. In order to implement this Islamic understanding, textbooks utilize recitations of
creeds and statements, as can be seen in a class 6 English textbook on “Our Country”:
“Who am I? I am a Muslim. I am a Pakistani. I love my country and I love my people…
You know that you are a Muslim and your religion is Islam.”101 Thus, Pakistani students
are told exactly who they are and are coerced into agreeing with such statements.
Not only do textbooks homogenize along Muslim lines, but they instill hatred
towards Hindus through extremist language and images, as can be seen from a class 5
Urdu textbook: “Hindu has always been the enemy of Islam.”102 Similarly, a different
class 5 textbook attempts to describe the Hindu religion as inferior to Islam with the
following imagery: “Hindus worship in temples which are very narrow and dark places,
where they worship idols. Only one person can enter the temple at a time. In our
mosques, on the other hand, all Muslims can say their prayers together.” 103 By utilizing
negative terms such as “narrow,” “dark,” and “idols,” this particular textbook paints a
picture of the Hindu religion and culture as backwards. Thus, textbooks are clearly
utilized to instill a hatred towards Hindus through such negative statements.
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Historical inaccuracies are similarly used to create hatred towards Hindus.
Consider the following comments about Pakistan’s violent past: “The British, with the
assistance of the Hindus, adopted a cruel policy of mass exodus against the Muslims to
erase them as a nation.” Similarly, “[The Muslims] were not allowed to profess their
religion freely.” Later on, this same textbook states, “Hindu nationalism was being
imposed upon Muslims and their culture.” 104 Again, Pakistani textbooks highlight
Hindus’ role as the enemy of Muslims without giving due regard to Muslims’ role in
similar conflicts. In this regard, another textbook attempts to portray how much more
civil Muslims have been in times of conflict as such: “The Hindus in Pakistan were
treated very nicely when they were migrating as opposed to the inhuman treatment meted
out to the Muslim migrants from India.”105 Thus, the educational establishment has been
able to shift any blame away from the Muslim majority’s own discriminatory policies and
instead identify themselves as the innocent victims in a historical struggle. They have
also been able to maintain the morality of their own policies towards other people groups
as a superior civilization.
After examining the history textbooks of Pakistan, Salim states that “students
don’t learn history. Rather, they are forced to read a carefully crafted collection of
falsehoods and fairy tales. History has been used to churn out a mythology about the
struggle that led to the creation of Pakistan.”106 For example, in describing the
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partitioning of the subcontinent and the struggle with India, Pakistani understanding is
that Hindu and Sikh enemies “killed and dishonored thousands, nay hundreds of
thousands of women, children, the old and the young with extreme cruelty and
heartlessness.” However, such a message fails to take into account the fact that Muslims
were also aggressors at this time and stand condemned for slaughter, rape, and other
atrocities.107 Finally, an examination of the “Civics for Pakistan” for classes 11 and 12
presents a history of violence by Hindus against Muslims without any retaliation.108 Thus,
through a biased history and extremist language embedded within their textbooks, the
Muslim establishment is able to build national unity founded on hatred towards Hindus.
It is interesting to note that such a one-sided portrayal of history was not always
the case in Pakistani education. Pakistani textbooks in the 1950s and 1960s, before the
coup of 1977, regarded Hindu history and culture in an “appreciative manner.” For
example, the textbooks of this time tend to recount the “grandeur” of the early Hindu and
Buddhist kingdoms “without any element of denigration.”109 In fact, these textbooks were
able to present a critical eye towards their own checkered past:
We have a high regard for Mohammad bin Qasim. He laid the foundation
for the Muslim rule in India. But the first brick of the foundation was
defective… Had Mohammad bin Qasim and the conquerors that followed
relied less on sword to increase their numerical strength and more on
preaching and other methods, we would have been spared events because
of which we are presently facing tribulations. 110
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Thus, it can be seen that the new mentality of hatred towards Hinduism stemmed from
the Islamization following the coup. Since then, the accounts of Muslim kings have been
falsified, distorted, and glorified to fit the program of Islamization. 111 In the new
curricula, anytime the word Hindu appears, it is usually always joined to negativelycharged adjectives such as “conniving” or “manipulative.”112
In Pakistan’s new understanding of its creation, Muhammad-bin-Qasim, who
appeared in the previously critical quote, is considered the first Pakistani citizen, who
overthrew the “infidel,” “cruel,” and “despotic” Sindhi King Raja Dahir. The people in
the region, “who were tired of the cruelties of Raja Dahir, joined hands with Muhammadbin-Qasim because of his good treatment.”113 Textbooks further go on to say:
For the first time, the people of Sindh were introduced to Islam, its
political system, and way of government. The people here had seen only
the atrocities of the Hindu Rajas… the people of Sindh were so much
impressed by the benevolence of Muslims that they regarded Muhammadbin-Qasim as their savior… On his departure from Sindh, the local people
were overwhelmed with grief. 114
In sum, the Pakistani textbooks attempt to present a smooth, unified history of Pakistan
that excludes any notion of the “two nation theory,” while firmly denying any examples
of a history of mutual co-existence between Muslims and Hindus.115
Furthermore, violence and jihad are common learning outcomes for the Pakistani
public education system. Several curricular directives and textbooks advise activities in
the classroom that include making speeches on the importance of jihad and for teachers
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Ibid, 67.
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to “judge their spirits” while students make such speeches. 116 In this regard, war and
martyrdom are glorified through images and anecdotes of Pakistani heroes of war. In
effect, Pakistani textbooks completely exclude “heroes from civil society” as role models
or inspirational figures.117 As Nayyar and Salim note, “Peace is the biggest and the most
urgent need for Pakistan.” However, learning outcomes call for a portrayal of enemy
images, a glorification of war and the use of force, and encouragement towards jihad. 118
For example, a class 1 social studies textbook’s cover is full of military images such as
missiles and soldiers being trained, and a class 4 social studies textbook includes several
pictures of battle and captions calling students to “always be ready to fight.”119 Several
textbooks urge students to become martyrs, to recognize the importance of jihad, with a
learning outcome to “create yearning for jihad in his heart.”120
Not only has education been used to instill hatred and violence towards Hindus
and outsiders, but it has been equally used to cause divisions within Muslim sectarianism.
In the Gilgit textbook controversy, particular images within state-sponsored Pakistani
textbooks promoted only Sunni understandings of the Islamic faith. Thus, it is argued that
these textbooks were utilized to further homogenize an Islamization program along evennarrower Sunni lines at the expense of Shia minorities. According to Nosheen Ali, “In
National Curriculum, Social Studies for Classes I-V, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education
(Curriculum Wing) Islamabad, March 2002, 33-35 as quoted in Nayyar, “Chapter 2: Insensitivity to the Religious
Diversity of the Nation,” 23.
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official curricula in Pakistan, the idealized and authorized Pakistani citizen is assumed to
be the Sunni Muslim, while other ways of being Muslim are silenced.” 121 As will be seen,
this occurs through visual depictions of religious faith and practice, as well as through a
singular viewpoint of Muslim key figures and authorities. 122 The textbooks in question
covered the major disciplines of Islamiat, Urdu, and social studies, and were developed
by the Punjab Textbook Board, which was composed of four Sunni scholars. These
textbooks were considered particularly egregious at the primary school level for their lack
of Shia representation, as well as their strong assertion of Sunni rituals on the
impressionable younger students.123
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For example, on the page shown above from a grade 1 textbook, the prayer rituals
favor a Sunni representation, since Shia typically keep their hands loose at their sides,
rather than folded in front as the image shows.124 This is especially problematic as
children see different practices at home and school, which disgruntled parents argued
could lead them gumrah (astray). 125 Similarly, the picture to the right is taken from a
grade 7 textbook, which is designed to help students imitate calligraphy of the four
caliphs: Abu Bak, Umar, Usman, and Ali, which is not in line with Shia beliefs, who
question the caliphate system and, instead, view Ali as the first iman.126 The calligraphy
exercises are particularly important, since a similar exercise caused a student to tear the
page out of his textbook, thus prompting the student boycott that led to the conflict. 127
The conflict ensued due to the fact that 75% of the Northern Areas of Pakistan are
Shia Muslim, which is not the case in the majority of Pakistan. For a state attempting to
homogenize along Sunni Muslim lines, “the Shia-majority Northern Areas thus constitute
a significant source of anxiety.”128 Leaders in the Northern Areas argued that they should
have their own textbook board to revise their own curricula like other areas of Pakistan.
However, such a demand was seen as an assertion of regional sovereignty, which was a
threat to the unified Pakistani state, thus causing the government crackdown on this
particular issue.129 In the end, the controversy resulted in a violent confrontation between
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Pakistani state authorities and Shia protestors in the region.130 In total, over one hundred
people lost their lives in the Gilgit textbook controversy. Victims included Shia children
traveling on buses, who were singled out as non-Sunni through their ID cards and killed
accordingly.131 In general, the controversy was engineered as a symbol of a history of
religious suppression in the Northern Areas and has further intensified the sectarian
differences in the region.132 The results in the short term have been further sect-specific
segregation throughout schools in Pakistan with no long-term solutions in sight. 133
Another form of education in Pakistan is the religious schools known as the
madrasahs. These are located all over the country and provide free education, as well as
free food, housing, and clothing. Because they are privately-funded and outside state
supervision, they are free to spread a “narrow and violent version of Islam.” 134 In
addition, madrasahs only offer religious instruction, thus ignoring math, science, and
other important subjects needed to function in society as a well-rounded citizen. In so
doing, graduates cannot find work because of a lack of practical education and are,
therefore, encouraged to fulfill their “spiritual obligations” by engaging in guerrilla
warfare and martyrdom against Hindus and other sects of Muslims throughout
Pakistan.135 It is estimated that 10% to 15% of Pakistan’s thousands of madrasahs teach
such extremist ideology.136 And because they are free, these schools are able to attract
poor families, who believe that the free education, food, and training will lead to better
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circumstances in this life and the one to come.137 Pakistan’s interior minister Moinuddin
Haider recognized the dangers the madrasahs pose when he said, “The brand of Islam
they are teaching is not good for Pakistan… Some, in the garb of religious training, are
busy fanning sectarian violence, poisoning people’s minds.” Thus, Haider announced
reforms that would require madrasahs to register with the government, expand their
curricula, and end the militant training camps.138 Nonetheless, these schools continue to
flourish across Pakistan, and their curricular content and practices have even been
exported to terrorist and guerrilla groups across the globe.139
Christine Fair represents a counter-study to the recent focus on madrasah by
surveying 141 families of slain militants or shaheed (martyrs) and determines that the
majority of Pakistani jihadists are highly-educated, but not from the madrasahs as has
been assumed. In her study, she notes that only 12% of her respondents attended
madrasah, of whom only 7% actually obtained a certificate, which would take at least 2
years of religious education. She concludes that such research shows that only about 4%
of Pakistanis actually attend madrasah full time.140 Similarly, she finds that only 22% of
respondents had less than a “matriculation,” which would be the equivalent of passing the
10th grade; however, according to the 1998 Census of Pakistan, only 32% of males
reached the matriculation stage, thus showing that Pakistani militants tend to be more
highly-educated than the population and more educated than the majority of the countries
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studied in the education-civil conflict literature. 141 Also of note, the majority of these
slain militants were between the ages of 17 and 25, and 26% claimed to have been
recruited directly from an educational institution, whether madrasah or public, thus
highlighting the role that education has played in not only promoting jihadist ideology,
but actively pushing students into military action. 142 Fair concludes:
When ones considers that throughout all of Pakistan fewer than one in
three males are matriculates, and when one considers further that the bulk
of this sample was derived from the Northwest Frontier Province where
educational attainment is among the lowest in Pakistan, the males in this
sample are extremely well educated, again underscoring the need to
interrogate common assumptions that Pakistan’s militants are all
uneducated, madaris products.143
Thus, madrasah reform is not enough for Pakistan, since both public and religious
schools stand condemned for fostering feelings of jihad and intolerance. Since the
majority of these martyrs came from public schools, reforms must begin there.
In sum, the case study of Pakistan further proves that homogenization through
biased curricular standardization can lead to societal divisions and violent outbreaks. The
textbook controversy represents a unique example in this thesis in that the curricular
content not only incited sectarian differences that led to conflict, but the very nature of
the conflict itself was waged over revising the curricula. Pakistan would do well to learn
from the textbook controversy and incorporate a plethora of viewpoints in its textbooks,
not only to ease sectarian strife, but to silence the hatred towards Hindus as well. On the
other hand, the madrasahs are an example of the damage that can be done by an
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educational institution free from all state restraint, while demonstrating the fact that
governments should provide free education, as well as food programs to all primary
school-age children at the least. Finally, Pakistan further proves that enrollment statistics
alone do not tell the whole story, since Pakistani militants tend to be highly-educated.
Sudan
The main reason why peace talks failed between the North and the South until
2005 in Sudan was because of the Northern-based government’s unwillingness to
recognize the country’s ethnic and religious diversity. Prior to South Sudan’s
independence in 2011, the Muslim Arabs in the North maintained control of the
government and the country’s policies, even though they represented a minority of the
Sudanese population.144 Their plan throughout their rule was to establish an Islamic state
based on sharia law, which included a subordination of rationality and modernist
discourse in favor of a literal, dogmatic interpretation of the Qur’an and its influence
over all areas of life. Anyone opposing such a plan was seen as opposing the very will of
Allah.145 This “Islamization” effectively marginalized all other beliefs and religious faiths
by drawing a sharp distinction between “believers and infidels.” 146 As a key proponent of
this ideology, the educational system in the North was thoroughly Islamized as well,
resulting in an attempted homogenization of a heterogeneous culture. By rewriting the
educational curricula along Arabic lines in history, geography, and intertwining Muslim
beliefs in all other subjects as well, the Northern government split the Sudanese state
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along ethnic and religious lines, thus playing a key role in instigating the military
resistance movement and separate education system in the South that followed.
It is important to begin with Sudanese history prior to independence in 1956, as it
was during this time that deep lines were drawn between Northern Arabs and Southern
African tribes. In 1879, a British officer named Charles Gordon took over the Sudanese
governorship in the employ of the Egyptians with goals of ending the slave trade.
However, he was killed in 1885 by Muhammad Ahmad al Mahdi, who sought to
implement an Islamic state. He and his successor, Khalifa Abdallah succeeded in this
endeavor and ruled Sudan for thirteen years, thus laying the foundations for the future
Arabic-Muslim nationalism that was to later influence Northern Sudan’s Islamization. In
1898, Lord Kitchener defeated Khalifa Abdallah, thus establishing a period of
complicated colonialism known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. In short, prior to
independence, Islamic groups promoted their ideology in the North, while British
colonizers spread their Western, Christian influence in the South.147
During British colonialism in the South, education was “intentionally
underdeveloped to maintain the perceived ‘purity’ of the Southern Sudanese and [to]
simplify administrative responsibilities.” 148 Christian missionaries, who largely did the
instructing during this time, placed an emphasis solely on evangelization at the expense
of a well-rounded education. Thus, education was not meant to teach children to read,
write, or critically think and contribute to society, but to prepare the way to the Christian
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religion and British culture. Indeed, the British government and Christian missionaries
agreed that “a literary education was dangerous,” due to the threat of revolt or violent
independent movements.149 These trends led to extremely poor educational quality in the
South prior to independence, which would play a key role in formulating the South’s
education system. More importantly, these trends also had an effect on creating a largely
Christian South Sudan that was distinct in every way from the North.
The government of Khartoum at the time of independence in 1956 believed that
establishing a Sudanese nationality along Islamic lines would create a sense of social
unity based on a “superior civilization.”150 Therefore, in 1957, President Ibrahim Abboud
nationalized all schools in Sudan, which led to the closure of numerous Christian
missionary schools and African rural schools. Even now, Southern Sudanese see this
action as the beginning of the Islamization that would slowly pervade all aspects of
Sudanese life and politics.151 South Sudan was left with a Muslim education that was
purposefully “inadequate,” due to a fear that an educated Southern population would be
more likely to rise up against the nascent government in Khartoum. 152 These policies
culminated in 1990 when President Bashir pushed educational reform to revise the
national curricula on solely Islamist values; therefore, new textbooks for all schools and
universities were to be produced with the goal of phasing out all non-government schools
and integrating all students into the new Islamic state-sponsored schools.153
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This curricula was created and assessed by the National Curriculum Center in
Khartoum (NCCER), which was filled with government appointees who fell in line with
the Sudanese government’s ideology. 154 Anders Breidlid interviewed a member of this
education board and asked about the wisdom of imposing an Islamic curriculum on a
culturally-diverse country. The interviewee “insisted on the inherent unity between the
South and the North and said that multiculturalism was taken care of and subsumed under
the umbrella of Tawhid or the oneness of God: ‘Sudan is one country based on cultural
and religious unity.’” 155 Thus, the NCCER refused to recognize the diversity present in
Sudan by creating a biased and intolerant curricula.
In general, the Islamic state that Northern Sudan was attempting to implement
was seen as superior to all other states and ideologies, as “something stable, universal,
unchangeable, and protected by firm principles of law and morality.”156 Therefore, any
perspective that did not coincide with Islamic principles were discarded. This is why
philosophy was largely absent from the education system since it gave too much weight
to reason, rather than faith. Similarly, African tribal culture and epistemology were
eliminated as they were seen as “inferior and uncivilized” and a threat to Islamic
identity.157 In sum, the Sudanese government believed in the importance of cultivating a
unified nation-state through education, even though Southerners and many in the
international community recognized South Sudan as a distinct cultural and religious
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entity. 158 But as Breidlid concludes, “The Islamists’ homogenizing efforts, however, often
had a negative effect: they created a fierce reaction which in many ways solidified and
cemented identities along ethnic and cultural lines rather than creating one hegemonic
identity.”159 Therefore, a deep resentment was created in South Sudan that eventually
transformed schools from a “refuge from conflict” into a platform to “express
resistance.” 160 Similar to the case in Kosovo, the Southern education system was seen as
an important form of identity formation along non-Arabic, non-Muslim lines. 161
In response, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in South Sudan
“fiercely resisted the imposition of an Islamist ideology in the education system.”
Because of this, the SPLM’s Ministry of Education introduced a secular, Western,
modernist educational system in the South as a counter-movement to the Islamization
efforts of the North. The goal of the new curricula was to be more “inclusive” and to
build a cohesive, Southern Sudanese identity across ethnic divides, rather than focusing
on individual tribal identities. However, even this had its flaws as it often homogenized a
diverse tribal community along a narrow, Western framework, while devaluing
indigenous values and culture.162 Breidlid further notes that the development of SPLMbacked education system as a tool for the “resistance struggle,” as well as the West’s
financial support of the Western discourse, made bridging the ideological gap between
the North and the South all but impossible.163 Indeed, such a reaction solidified identities
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along ethnic lines.164 “For Southerners, Christianity is now both a religion and a political
weapon against Islamization and Arabization.”165 Therefore, it can be said that both the
North and the South utilized homogenization to the detriment of peace and reconciliation.
The main strategy of the Northern-based Islamic curricula is to unify Sudan
through Arabic language and history and Muslim religion and culture. In an interview, a
Southern politician stated that Southern Sudanese students “suffer” because they are
unable to pass the national examinations due to the fact that their Arabic is not good
enough. Similarly, he stated, “Our children do not learn where they come from. They do
not learn anything about our history, culture, and language.”166 The Sudanese history
textbooks in particular purposefully exclude other viewpoints and discriminate against
those who do not speak Arabic and do not identify with the Arabic-Muslim culture. The
following example of a simple statement in a textbook before and after the period of
Islamization shows how Islamization has pervaded all aspects of Sudanese life: prior to
Islamization, this textbook stated, “Today I will go to school. Tomorrow I will go to the
dentist. Friday I will go to the cinema.” However, this statement was replaced by: “Today
I will pray five times. Tomorrow I will read in the Qur’an. Friday I will go to the
Mosque.”167 Along these same lines, each chapter in the math textbooks open with a
Qur’anic verse in order to further the idea that not only is Sudan a Muslim country, but to
recognize Tawhid in that religion pervades all aspects of life.168 Furthermore, all textbook
images portray men and women as Arabic with Arabic clothing and Arabic names, thus
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furthering the illusion that Sudan is only Arabic-Muslim.169 According to a UNESCO
report compiled by G.L. Arora, of the 59 textbooks developed by the NCCER for grades
1 to 8, only three have been produced in English, with the rest being in the Arabic
language, while “the mother tongue of the child is not taught at any stage of school
education.”170 Arora further notes that Arabic classes receive 22% of school time, while
20% of lessons are related to religion in some way since the the inclusion of religion as a
compulsory area of curricular content falls in line with the goal of the national education
policy to instill religious thinking in every aspect of life. 171 Therefore, through language
and images, South Sudanese students were discriminated against within the Sudanese
education system. Besides the one-sidedness of the subject matter, Sudanese education in
the North also left little room for a well-rounded, civic curricula apart from Islam.
The Arabic-Islamic overarching narrative was also furthered through history. In
an equivalent of a social science course called “Things Around Us” for grades 1-4 and
“Man and the Universe” for grades 5-8, Arab history is dominant without hardly a hint of
tribal history and African ethnicities. One particular chapter is called “Man’s Advent to
the Sudan,” and it begins with the coming of Arab Muslims to Sudan without even
mentioning the fact that Christianity had been present in Sudan centuries prior.
Conspicuously missing as well is the Arab slave trade in the interior of present-day South
Sudan.172 Thus, Sudanese identity through history focused on a Northern Arabic
perspective alone. In sum, after an analysis of 41 textbooks created by the NCCER,
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Breidlid concludes that “the Arab-Muslim bias is overwhelming… South Sudanese
history, religion, and culture are almost entirely left out.”173
On the other hand, it is equally important to examine aspects of the South
Sudanese education system in order to present a full picture of the connection between
education and the various conflicts that have affected Sudan. Indeed, after South Sudan’s
independence in 2011, a further conflict erupted in 2013 within South Sudan, which has
been fought along dissenting political and tribal lines. In this regard, Merethe Skaras and
Breidlid performed a study on South Sudanese education post-independence by
examining classroom teaching from 2014 to 2015 to see how South Sudanese schools
teach their violent past. Skaras and Breidlid conclude that national unity is attempted by
demonizing the Arab North, while smoothing over any ethnic tensions among the South
Sudanese through lecture-based instruction with little room for discussion. In terms of
demonizing the Arab North, one teacher stated to the class:
That ill feelings or hatred or distrust is still existing. Even though we are
now two separate countries. Even though we are now two separate
countries, ok. That ill feelings, that hatred, that distrust is still existing, ok.
Between the southerners and the northerners. Why? Because during the
war the Arabs who were here in the south killed and mistreated the
southerners, ok. So that was the reason why these ill feeling is still there
existing today. Good. 174
Furthermore, another teacher was recorded as teaching the students:
If you learn the way your people suffered and the question you should ask
is always: who was responsible for that? Ok. Or who inflicted that
suffering on our people. Definitely, the answer is the Arabs and it makes
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you not to love the Arabs. Yeah. It makes you to look the Arabs as the
immediate enemy, the first enemy of South Sudan, you know.175
These feelings of resentment can be noticed first-hand in student essays that were
examined within Skaras and Breidlid's study. In an essay written about the causes of the
war, all of the 69 respondents state that “marginalization” and “exploitation” by the North
were the key factors that led to the civil war, and the culprits were the “elites” of the
North within the Khartoum government. Thus, feelings of resentment are reinforced,
legitimized, and even carry over to the current conflict. 176
In the current conflict, it appears that the South Sudanese curriculum attempts to
avoid discussion of ethnicity in order to create a “unified past narrative and collective
memory” as a form of national unity. 177 For example, in one classroom observation
performed by Skaras and Breidlid, when a student asked a question about the ethnic
tensions in the South, the teacher gave a “superficial” answer to the question while
completely avoiding ethnicity. 178 Skaras and Breidlid conclude that disproportionately
blaming the Northern Arabs, while discarding any notions of ethnic tensions in the South
may be “counterproductive.”179 By minimizing or completely avoiding the recent civil
war, the South Sudanese curriculum has resorted to historical inaccuracies, a lack of
discussion and critical thinking, and removing the voice and perspective of those who
have experienced loss.180 This has played out most prominently in the Nilotic vs. nonNilotic tribal divisions. In interviews with teachers and students, the Nilotic tribes are
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“described as different people with different mentalities, not well civilized and totally
behind in terms of development.”181 Therefore, Skaras and Breidlid note that though
avoiding the topic may be “pedagogically sound,” not addressing the divisions only serve
to reinforce the narrative circulating in the South that describes the Nilotic tribes as
backwards and aggressive, thus furthering the ethnic divisions causing the current civil
war.182 In general, the South Sudanese curriculum fails to address the “structural causes
of conflict or the role of Southerners as active participants in the war,” while painting an
exclusively negative stereotype of the Arab Northerners and sweeping any divisions
among Southerners under the rug to the detriment of reconciliation and healing. 183
In sum, education systems in Sudan certainly exacerbated conflict through a
homogenization along Arabic-Muslim lines, as well as a lack of honesty in the South
Sudanese curriculum. A policy of Islamization, though seeking to unify Sudan, in fact
widened the differences between the North and the South, “escalating the conflict
between them and giving it a racial and religious dimension that eventually reached
genocidal proportions.”184 Without a diversity of perspectives, Sudanese education
systems may continue to aggravate tensions along ethnic, tribal, and religious lines on
both sides. The case of Sudan also highlights the fact that independence is not a panacea
for ethnic conflict. Indeed, peace and coexistence must be predicated on a recognition of
Sudanese diversity, and educational policy and curricular reform could be a necessary
step towards achieving such goals.
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Chapter Five: A Contrasting Case Study — Canada
Canada is considered by many to be one of the most diverse among the Western
nations, and it has had relatively little internal conflict in recent history. Thus, in light of
the previous case studies examined, the question must be asked: How has Canada
maintained peace with such diversity? And how has Canada utilized its education system
to mobilize informed, global citizens who appreciate differences, rather than fearing
them? In their study on ethnic diversity and multiculturalism in Canada’s current
curricula, Carla Peck, Alan Sears, and Shane Donaldson state that “education has been
one of the principle vehicles for accomplishing the paired goals of accommodating
diversity while maintaining social cohesion.”185 However, it is important to note that this
was not always the case. Prior to World War II, Canada’s policy was to bar immigrants
who did not fit the “dominant White, British culture,” and to assimilate already-present
non-White people groups into that culture as best as possible. A change occurred in 1947,
however, with the Citizenship Act, which was key in shifting “Canadian Identity”
towards multiculturalism, rather than assimilation.186 These shifts in Canadian politics
eventually trickled down to the education system as well. Prior to this time, Canadian
schools and curricula were designed to “homogenize a diverse population” built on “a
common English language, a common culture, a common identification with the British
Empire, and an acceptance of British institutions and practices.”187 This changed
throughout 1965 to 1975, when a “tidal wave” of revisions in the educational systems
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began to focus on accommodating ethnic differences.188 Thus, Canada represents the
ideal contrasting case as it possesses similar features to the cases of Kosovo, Pakistan,
and Sudan: ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity; questions of first occupation to a
“homeland”; and a complicated, conflictual history. Despite these insurmountable topics
— topics that Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sudan failed to address — Canada’s curricula excels
in being honest, critical, and open-minded to the many distinct viewpoints represented
within Canadian identity. This contrasting case study will examine the social studies
subjects represented in the Ontario Curriculum due to the fact that Ontario represents one
of the most diverse regions of Canada.189
Before delving into the curricular content, it must be noted that the Ontario
curriculum promotes learning through a variety of methods, which it terms “disciplinary
thinking,” which is important for students to come to their own conclusions. Mastering
the skills of this type of thinking includes investigation, evaluating evidence,
collaborative discussion, and the creation and use of appropriate materials, including
technology and visuals such as maps and graphs. 190 Such an emphasis on diverse learning
methods puts a priority on critical thinking, rather than simple rote memorization or
lectured-based instruction. Similarly, because of the collaborative nature of Canada’s
learning process, students learn to consider and respect other’s perspectives.191 In sum,
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the simplified goal of the curricula’s social studies is to help Canadians recognize the
advantage of their multicultural diversity and role as global citizens.192
The Ontario Curriculum for grades 1-6 Social Studies and grades 7-8 History and
Geography were revised from the 2004 curriculum and went into effect on September
2014.193 The Ontario Curriculum for Grades 11-12 Canadian and World Studies were
revised from the 2005 curriculum and went into effect on September 2015.194 All social
studies subjects share a common vision and goal, which is laid out as follows: “The social
studies, history, geography, and Canadian world studies programs will enable students to
become responsible, active citizens within the diverse communities to which they
belong.”195 Thus, as opposed to Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sudan where diversity was
sacrificed for the sake of unity, Canada recognizes diversity as the foundation upon which
civic engagement and social cohesion can be built. This is reflected in its curricula as can
be seen from the way it shapes Canadian identity, the way it deals with its difficult past,
and the way it accommodates ethnic and linguistic differences.
First, Canadian identity is built on diversity and recognizing “the other.” In the
opening paragraphs of the Ontario curriculum, it is stated that “students develop their
understanding of where they came from by studying past societies, analyzing connections
between the past and present, and exploring the contributions of past societies to
Canadian heritage.”196 Furthermore, the curriculum encourages teachers to select topics
and resources that reflect the diversity within the classroom as a way of recognizing the
Ibid, 9.
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195 Ibid, 6.
196 Ibid, 11.
192
193

!56

“diversity and complexity of Canadian society.”197 Therefore, rather than
homogenization, Canada’s classrooms celebrate diversity. For example, a lesson for grade
2 includes the following:
Identify some different groups in their community (e.g., various religious
and ethnocultural groups), and describe some of the ways in which they
contribute to diversity in Canada (e.g., different languages, foods, music,
clothing, holidays; ethnic neighborhoods with specialized shops and
restaurants).198
From these discussion questions and learning outcomes, it can be seen that Canadian
curricular content places a priority on understanding Canadian diversity from a plethora
of platforms: religious, cultural, linguistic, etc. For grade 3, a similar lesson includes the
following discussion topics as a means by which diversity is recognized through
Canada’s multiethnic history:
Describe some of the similarities and differences in various aspects of
everyday life of selected groups living in Canada between 1780 and 1850
(e.g., First Nations, Métis, French, British, Black people; men and women;
slaves, indentured servants, habitants, seigneurs, farmers; people from
different classes)… Identify some key components of the Canadian
identity (e.g., bilingualism, multiculturalism, founding nations, religious
freedom), and describe some of the ways in which communities that were
in Canada around the early 1800s have had an impact on Canadian
identity.199
Similarly, in grade 6, a lesson encourages students to “evaluate some of the contributions
that various ethnic and/or religious groups have made to Canadian identity.”200
Finally, in grade 8, lessons in diversity and Canadian identity become more hands-on
with students examining and investigating ethnic groups other than their own:
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Gather and organize information and evidence about perspectives of
different groups on some significant events, developments, and/or issues
that affected Canada and/or Canadians during this period, using a variety
of primary sources.201
Through these activities, Ontario’s curriculum encourages students to not only appreciate
Canada’s diversity, but to investigate the “how” and “why” behind Canada’s origins and
ethnic makeup. It is also important to note that in Canada’s classrooms, the teacher is not
simply lecturing students on diversity. Instead, students are encouraged to discuss, think
critically, and utilize historical understandings and inquiry.
Diversity themes are furthered in grades 11 and 12 through the history curricula,
whereby it is hoped that the lessons will “convey a sense of the dynamic nature of
Canadian and world history. Students learn that the people of the world have many stories
and that each one is significant and requires thoughtful consideration.”202 In fact, a key
course within the the grade 11 social studies curricula is a project called “The History of
a Canadian Ethnic Group,” whereby students work together to examine how diverse
people groups comprise Canadian identity by “anyalyz[ing] the historical development of
key social structures and trends,” “describ[ing] some ways in which social factors in their
countries of origin influenced people’s decisions to emigrate,” and by “analyz[ing]
challenges and opportunities associated with preserving cultural diversity in Canada.”203
Therefore, as students progress through their social studies, they grow from a simple
acknowledgement of Canada’s diversity towards a thoughtful consideration of the social
structures that have influenced and created such diversity.
Ibid, 149.
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Second, accommodation is made within the classroom to all types of people
groups through not only including diverse cultural perspectives, but through a priority
placed on helping those who have the added challenge of “language-learning.” In order to
seek “fair, transparent, and equitable” assessment for all students, the Ontario curriculum
provides support for those with special education needs and those who are not yet
proficient in the language of instruction, which is either English or French, depending on
the area. Such provisions are especially made for immigrants, as well as First Nation,
Metis, or Inuit students.204 Thus, “All teachers share in the responsibility for these
students’ English-language development,” as well as general development.205 Such an
enormous task is not seen as arduous or a hindrance to learning, but rather such students
are seen as a “cultural asset” for the “rich diversity of background knowledge and
experience” that they bring to the classroom.206 In fact, the Ontario curriculum
recommends for teachers to encourage parents of such children to continue in their first
language and even to “find opportunities to bring students’ languages into the classroom,
using parents and community members as a resource.”207 Therefore, as opposed to
Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sudan, whereby thousands of students were discriminated against
based on their language, Ontario instead encourages and celebrates linguistic diversity.
The most important aspect for such an inclusive education system is that “all
students see themselves reflected in the curriculum.”208 Indeed, the Ontario curriculum
calls for bringing attention to the contributions of women, the cultural traditions of the
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First Nations, Metis, and Inuit, as well as the perspectives of various ethnic and religious
communities throughout history.209 Along these lines, injustices and inequalities are
critically examined. But as opposed to the Kosovo case, for example, that focused on
victimization experienced within injustice, Canada’s curriculum looks at such tragedies
from the perspective of how those who have faced injustices have “acted as agents of
change and can serve as role models for active citizenship.” 210 For example:
Explain how various groups have contributed to the goal of inclusiveness
in Canada (e.g., the efforts of women’s rights, civil rights, First Nations, or
labour organizations, or of advocacy organizations for immigrants,
disabled people, or various religious or ethnic groups), and assess the
extent to which Canada has achieved the goal of being an inclusive
society.211
Thus, rather than focusing on “enemies,” “the other,” or identity formation within
“victimization,” Canada encourages social justice as a primary responsibility of
citizenship within Canada’s diverse communities. Furthermore, Canadians value honesty
and sensitivity about the hardships that immigrants have faced in terms of relocating to a
new country, culture, and language. Such is the case in a grade 11 activity: “Analyze
some challenges that Canadian immigration policies have presented to some ethnic
groups, with a particular focus, where applicable, on the selected ethnic group.”212
Third, as has been seen from the case studies examined in this thesis, ethnicallydiverse countries tend to whitewash their past by providing a smooth fabric of history,
thus refusing a voice to the oppressed. Canada, on the other hand, is honest about its
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historical wrongs. For example, consider a grade 7 activity on displacement: “Analyze
the displacement experienced by various groups who were living in or who came to
Canada between 1713 and 1800… and compare it with present-day examples of
displacement.” 213 The purpose of such an activity is not to simply dredge up such
injustices, but to “think critically about global inequalities.”214 Rather than rewriting
history in order to present a seamless, conflict-free Canadian origin mythology, as has
been attempted in Pakistan or Sudan, the Ontario curriculum recognizes the injustices
that Canada’s original inhabitants have suffered. In sum, through studying history and
Canadian identity formation, as well as through its inclusive system that promotes
diversity and accommodation for language-learners, Canada encourages citizenship and
collaboration, rather than conflict or segregation.
In conclusion, Canada represents an even more culturally-diverse country than
any of Kosovo, Pakistan, or Sudan, with an equally complicated history, though
extremely low levels of conflict. Though this most likely is due to the stability of the
country in general, the fact that the government took such great pains to invest in a
multicultural education revision proves the importance that Canada places on continuing
that stability through education. Canada reverses all of the trends seen in the case studies
of Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sudan by celebrating diversity and heterogeneity as an
important foundation for national unity and social cohesion; by being honest about its
history; and by accommodating ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences.
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Chapter Six: Conclusions and Implications
The Hidden Crisis clarifies the education-civil conflict connection as follows:
“Education is seldom, if ever, the primary motivation for armed conflict… Perhaps that is
why the role of education in contributing to violent conflict has been so widely
neglected.”215 Indeed, in all cases examined in this thesis, education was clearly not an
afterthought in connection to civil conflict. In both Sudan and Kosovo, education was
seen as a vital part of the resistance movements’ identity formation and political
legitimacy, which is the reason why parallel education systems were formed early on. In
Pakistan, the education system is much stronger and consolidated in the central
government; yet still, the textbook controversy shows that educational representation was
important to minorities and evoked a violent response. Therefore, education is vitally
important for an understanding of causes of civil conflict. Nonetheless, the question must
be asked: is education merely something that is fought over, or do educational institutions
actually contribute to violence through the nationalistic messages that they propagate?
Based on my research, I would argue that education does contribute towards the
instigation or exacerbation of civil conflict through the homogenization of a heterogenous
culture, as well as through the careful manipulation of language and images in textbooks.
Through a study of Kosovo, Pakistan, Sudan, and Canada, it becomes readily
apparent that governments see value in homogenizing identity and language in order to
create a sense of national unity and shared values. However, especially in the three
negative cases, what was less understood at that time was how a system of assimilation
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provoked a response of resistance and even violence from the out-group. Establishing a
centralized language in a linguistically-diverse society naturally excludes minorities. In
these cases, demonization of “the other” are created in the minds of the majority, while
minorities experience discrimination, exclusion, and linguistic repression. Especially in
the case of Sudan, students who were not fluent in the primary language could not
partake of educational and, in effect, economic advantages that were afforded the
majority. In this way, governments, especially through language, have furthered unequal
educational access, thus indirectly sparking conflict. In all three cases of Kosovo,
Pakistan, and Sudan, linguistic homogenization in the state-sponsored curricula sparked
non-violent educational resistance movements that eventually transformed into fullfledged military contestations. Similarly, homogenization of identity seeks to create a
singular sense of nation that excludes minority viewpoints in order to falsely instill a
shared sense of what it means to be Kosovar, Pakistani, or Sudanese. But rather than
include diverse viewpoints, the educational systems of these countries smoothed over
complex, divergent histories and relationships. In so doing, entire people groups and their
culture were left out, thus necessitating resistance to save ethnic heritage. It is interesting
to note that it is not always the students who feel such dispossession and lack of
representation, but it is oftentimes the parents and other educational actors who respond
for the sake of furthering their own culture and history in the coming generations. In sum,
all three of the negative case studies show how homogenization in an education system
for the sake of national unity more often than not creates the very opposite outcome that
is hoped for. In the case of Canada, on the other hand, a policy of accommodation, rather
!63

than assimilation, has created an accepting environment for all languages, identities, and
experiences.
By way of more specific examples of how identity matters, all of the case studies
examined highlight the importance of history and homeland to education systems. Much
research has been done on the topic of history as formative for a national or ethnic
identity. History not only informs people who they are and where they come from, but
where they are going as well. Thus, when such a crucial aspect of identity formation is
taken away or covered up, feelings of repression must follow. History can equally evoke
feelings of pride, as well as victimization, in creating a sense of self. In the case of
Kosovo specifically, Serbs and Albanians have learned through their own histories to hate
one another for historical wrongs. In Pakistan, history is utilized to instill hatred for their
enemy, the Hindus; while in Sudan, a different approach is taken whereby the centralized
government smooths over conflict in the country in order to falsify a seamless, conflictfree history. In Canada, on the other hand, history not only includes many facets and
perspectives, but teachers are not afraid to discuss openly the low-points of Canada’s own
history in a critical way. Thus, it becomes obvious that the way educational institutions
handle history is crucial for instilling a sense of identity, as well as a correct view of “the
other.” Identity is further connected to the homeland, since as has been noted, geography,
space, and boundaries create a physical representation of what it means to be Kosovar,
Pakistani, or Sudanese. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the civil conflict of
Kosovo. As Kostovicova notes, in times of conflict, education not only becomes about
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reading and writing, but about an understanding of the “fatherland.”216 Thus, feelings of
dispossession are evoked when the homeland is infringed upon through historical and
geographical manipulation of textbooks.
In conclusion, it is apparent from these case studies that there is a connection
between education and civil conflict, both in terms of access, as well as content.
However, not enough evidence exists to state whether or not educational content
represents a primary instigator of civil conflict. Nonetheless, it can be said that curricular
content has been utilized by warring parties to exacerbate already-present ethnic or
religious divisions. In this way, governments and resistance movements have utilized
education to form competing national identities that instill a sense of hatred towards “the
other.” Such identity formation is vitally important towards the provocation of civil
conflict, and there is arguably no better medium by which such a large-scale message can
be spread en masse than through education. However, it is impossible to say with any
certainty, for example, whether or not the Kosovar conflict would have reached its
horrifying climax with or without the impact of education. Are civil conflicts established
merely through political or economic reasons, or could social factors such as education
play a vital role as well? While there are greater aspects that need to be addressed in order
to deal with the root cause of civil conflict, educational factors must be included in any
analyses of civil conflict in order to not only deal with the ethnic or religious tensions
present within a country, but in order to reshape a people’s thinking and policies for the
future.
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